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A demand for public action in the economic field is usually a 
reflection of the fact that, at least for some people, the private 
sector is yielding unsatisfactory results. This fairly describes 
the current situation as regards environmental protection. Many if 
not most people have concluded that private firms acting without 
public constraints will produce a higher than acceptable level of 
pollution. Unfortunately, whereas the demand for public action is 
quite general, the public response must be highly specific; the 
Government must decide when, where, and how to act.
The theme of this paper revolves around the need for Governments 
to formulate environmental protection plans for both abandoned mine 
sites and ongoing mining activity. Therefore, the first thing I 
will discuss is why environmental problems almost invariably become 
public policy issues. Second, I will discuss how we can make the 
needed economic evaluations of suggested policies or programs. 
Finally, I want to suggest some things that such evaluations can 
tell us about appropriate public actions.
WHY A PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM ?
In some ways there is little that is new about the economics 
of mined-!and reclamation. Every mine affects the land and the rest 
of the environment just by breaking the surface, and, conversely, the 
character of the land always affects the mining system in some way.
However, if the land problem is old, today's approach to it is 
new. Formerly land and the rest of the environment were viewed 
simply as obstacles that had tc be overcome on the way to getting 
minerals, and the engineer's objective was to minimize the costs of 
overcoming them. But today we have come to realize that value is 
placed on preserving the non-mineral benefits of the environment. In 
other words, the miner now deals with two productive resources--the 
minerals and the environment.
The origin of this shift in emphasis is perhaps obvious. On the 
one hand, the minerals industry is using increasing amounts of land. 
The most dramatic figures relate to surface mining: over the past
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twenty years the proportion of coal recovered from surface mines has 
increased from 20 to 35%; the proportion of iron ore, from 75 to 90%; 
and the proportion of copper ore from 66 to 80%. ]_/ Deep mining also
makes demands on land use. According to Bureau of Mines estimates, 
some 2,000,000 acres (3,125 square miles) have been undermined to such 
a degree that they have subsided. Probably moreimportant, about 
158,000 of those acres (250 square miles) are in urban areas. And 
there are solid wastes as well. Through 1966 around 19 billion tons 
of solid waste exclusive of strip mine spoil have been produced by 
mining and mineral processing, and this waste covers around 1.8 million 
acres.
But others also have a demand for this land. For convenience let 
outdoor recreation represent all non-mineral uses of the environment. 
Between 1965 and 1966— ha1f the number of years noted above for the 
growth of surface mining— visits to National Parks doubled; visits to 
National Forests for recreation purposes doubled; and expenditures by 
the public for outdoor recreation more than doubled. 2/ If we mentally 
add other demands for land to this one, it becomes obvious why the 
minerals industry must now treat the environment as productive.
However, these trends do not get to the heart of the matter. All 
they show is that there is a conflict, a growing conflict, between 
those people who want to use land for mineral extraction and those 
who want to use it for another purpose. We must still answer the 
real question of why the conflict becomes a public policy issue. After 
all, we have hundreds of conflicts over resource use in our system, but 
ordinarily we let the private market decide who gets what, and also how 
much he must pay for it. In this sense, conflict is only another term 
for competition; we leave the decisions to private parties and assume 
that their actions, without public intervention, serve the public 
interest.
But there are instances where the public does intervene in the 
market, and let us examine the rationale behind a few such situations.
In some cases the Government actually prohibits production, as with 
opium. In this case production is forbidden because it is believed 
that the social costs that attend use of this commodity are much 
greater than any private returns that might accrue to the producer. 
Another case is the public utility. Public utilities operate in 
sectors where it has been found technologically efficient to have a 
single producer-one telephone line, one gas pipeline--but having 
encouraged the formation of a monopoly, Government has to act as 
an overseer to prevent abuses in pricing and service.
What rationale might underlie Government involvement in pollution 
problems generally and mined-land reclamation specifically? The 
answer is that mining is one of a number of productive activities in 
which the very act of production does, or at least can, result in costs 
that do not appear in any market transaction or that do not appear in 
the correct one, which indicates that the market system is not operating
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as it should.
This is a little abstract so let me approach it by contrasting two 
terms: internal cost and external cost. Internal costs are those 
that any mine operator must take into account because they appear on 
his account books: costs like explosives, fuel, and wages. These 
are the costs that the firm attempts to minimize. However, there may 
also be external costs, of which pollution is a prominent example.
But consider first a simpler case, blasting. If a mining firm sets 
off a blast that breaks someone's window, this firm has imposed a 
cost, but one that does not necessarily appear on its account books 
and one that it therefore has no incentive to minimize. Fortunately, 
legal recourse has been adequate for most problems raised by blasting, 
but the court system is not well adapted to deal with pollution where 
the sources may be several and the damages diffuse.
A number of authors have documented the external environmental 
effects of mining. 3] Consider a strip mine that dumps waste over the 
side of a hill into a stream. In effect, the mine is treating this 
water as a free good and therefore lowering its own costs. But this 
act may impose higher costs on a farmer downstream when the water 
table is raised or fields flooded as a result of sediment-clogged 
streams. The public may pay higher costs as culverts are clogged or 
road banks eroded. Cities may have to pay higher treatment costs for 
their water. All of these are measurable costs that are imposed by 
the mining operation.
The point is the following: from the perspective of the whole 
economy— not just the single firm-external costs are just as important 
as internal costs. Moreover, just as efficiency for the firm requires 
private cost minimization, so does efficiency for the economy require 
social cost minimization. This means that the economy must be one in 
which total costs of production-including direct production costs, 
waste disposal costs, and external environmental costs— are minimized. 4/ 
And here we have the essence of the problem: those with control over 
external costs have no incentive to minimize them; those with the 
incentive to minimize them have no control over them. 5/
This already suggests some conclusions. It would appear that 
efficiency in the economy could be improved by institutions that will 
force external costs to be considered by those who cause them. Also, 
the figures indicate that the problem of mined-land reclamation is much 
bigger than coal strip mining. It includes all of the effects that 
mining imposes on the land surface regardless of the commodity involved 
or the type of mining. 6/ And, further, statements to the effect that 
mining occupies only a very small part of the land surface are quite 
irrelevant when the effects that we are worried about occur downslope, 
downstream, or downwind of the mine site.
In short, all mining and mineral processing operations have effects 
on the land surface, and some of these effects impose damages. When
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external costs are large and widespread, the free market may yield 
results that are far from ideal and this fact provides the rationale 
for public action.
THE BENEFIT-COST APPROACH TO PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
So much for generalities about why mined-land becomes a public 
policy problem. For our purposes, the important thing is that once 
we have recognized a policy issue, we also need a decision model, for 
by the very definition of the problem the market system on which we 
rely for most decisions is inadequate.
The economist's suggestion for such a model is, in one form or 
another, benefit-cost analysis. This approach was originally develop­
ed to decide whether government investment projects like dams were 
worthwhile, but it can be adapted to great advantage in proposals for 
pollution control and environmental protection.
Briefly, benefit-cost analysis is based on the assumption that 
there is always a variety of possible courses of public action and 
that these alternative courses will vary in effectiveness (i.e ., bene­
fits) and cost. Since selection must be made among the proposals, the 
goal of the framework is to rank alternatives by evaluating both the 
benefits to be gained and the cost entailed by each. (Or, what comes 
to the same thing, to compare what would happen with some new policy 
or program in effect and what would happen without it.) Furthermore, 
inasmuch as the alternatives will vary in their impact on various 
groups in society, it is also essential to identify who will receive 
the benefits and who will pay the costs.
In the case of mining and mineral processing, there are alternative 
ways to effect (1) elimination of adverse environmental effects at 
abandoned sites and (2) regulation of existing operations so as to 
reduce or eliminate adverse environmental effects. The difficult 
part is that all costs and all benefits should be included, and they 
must both be valued correctly. As you can well imagine, this is no 
easy task. Obviously, we can hardly hope to touch on even the high 
points of benefit-cost analysis here. But I can suggest something 
about the kinds of information needed to make it work.
Damage Functions and Benefits
The simple fact that wastes are present in the evnironment does 
not per se indicate pollution. Rather, as implied above, pollution 
occurs only when waste disposal practices— or the lack of them— have 
adverse effects on other parties. In order to determine the benefits 
that can be obtained from different practices, it is essential to 
have some idea of the nature and extent of the damages. As stated 
in a recent report:
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"The heart of the waste management problem involves 
(1) determining the impact of waste discharges on 
quality of the environment, with impact measured 
by the time pattern of concentrations of wastes; 
and (2) determining the effects of time patterns 
of waste concentrations on users of water, air and 
land." 7/
Potential benefits can be estimated from damage functions. A 
damage function relates the quantity and quality of wastes discharged 
to the resulting effects measured as economic costs. For example, 
in Figure 1 a given output yields a certain quantity of waste which 
in turn causes certain damages depending upon the level of treatment. 
Admittedly, this illustration is oversimplified, but it does show 
that damage reduction is the objective and that benefits can be 
obtained by shifting the damage function (as from the solid to the 
dashed line).
In addition, the shape of a damage function can tell us a great 
deal about the benefits to be derived from either regulations or re­
clamation. It could indicate that there is a threshold concentration 
of some effluent below which no damages are discernable for a given 
use (as with point A in Figure 1). For example, suspended sediment 
of colloidal size may present no adverse effects in water intended for 
agricultural use, though it would be most unpleasant for recreational 
use. On the other hand, the damage function could indicate that con­
siderable reduction of an effluent is required before economic damages 
are appreciably reduced (as between points B and C). This is likely 
to be true for acid drainage within the pH range of 3 to 5.
Different population densities and different concentrations of 
economic activities are bound to influence the level of damages. For 
example, the economic damages resulting from an equal degree of sub­
sidence may be negligible in a wooded area but high in an urban one.
In other instances, the damages may be related to variations in stream 
hydrology, with greater damages occurring during times of low water 
flow.
Finally, an attempt must be made to identify, if not measure, 
intangible damages. The most important of these are primarily 
aesthetic, such as the difference between a clear mountain stream 
and a muddy or rubble-filled one. Fortunately, some procedures have 
been developed to deal with such cases that avoid the need for direct 
estimation of benefits. The differences among land values for loca­
tions with different levels of quality have been used for this purpose. 
Among other measures are the extra distance people will drive to 
find an unpolluted (or less polluted) recreation area, the added cost 
of sound insulation in the home, and the higher medical expenses from 
living in certain areas. 8/
One form of damage deserves special mention because it can be 
critical in certain regions, viz, the effect of mine effluents, sub-
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sidence, or abandoned mines on economic development. The difficulty 
lies in the need, first, to project the course of development with 
and without alternative waste disposal policies or reclamation pro­
grams and, then, to translate any differences in the rate of economic 
growth into benefits attributable to improved management of mining 
wastes. Regional income may have to be an explicit goal before such 
benefits can be counted.
Cost Functions and Costs
The second half of a benefit-cost analysis involves estimation 
of the costs of accomplishing whatever treatment procedure or reclama­
tion programis proposed. These are reflected in cost functions, which 
show the expense of alternative waste management schemes plotted against 
the rate of production.
In planning, cost functions should be evaluated for a wide variety 
of alternative techniques. At one extreme may be those that require 
only increasing the efficiency of existing processes; at the other 
may be possibilities for regional waste management or for relocating 
entire communities. Even within a mine or plant, there are alterna­
tives that may have very different cost functions. For example, treat­
ment of some effluent may be quite expensive per unit treated but 
overall control costs reduced by process changes that diminish the 
volume of waste generated. 9/ In any case, research can be expected 
to cut the costs of waste management as attention is directed to them.
The cost function for each waste management alternative will con­
sist of both investment and operating costs computed in terms of the 
quantity or quality of waste treated and in terms of the results (that 
is, reduced subsidence, less discharge, or whatever). These cost 
measurements are likely to show two significant aspects. One is eco­
nomies of scale. That is, the cost per unit of waste treatment or of 
land reclamation is likely to decrease significantly as the volume of 
waste treated or land reclaimed increases. It is this consideration 
that suggests the possibility for regional treatment of certain pollut­
ants or for regional redevelopment schemes. The other aspect likely to 
be shown by the cost information is diminishing returns. In most cases, 
the cost of treatment rises very steeply as 100 percent removal of some 
particular pollutant is approached. The comparable difficulty with 
reclamation may lie with the increase in expenditure as the time allow­
ed for reclamation diminishes, or as a greater degree of reclamation 
(to the limit of returning the land to its original state) is approached. 
This aspect suggests that except for the most virulent kinds of pollution 
(which are not likely to occur with mining) a balance should be struck 
between the costs of controlling adverse effects and the results (bene­
fits), which is the subject of the next section.
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Comparing Alternatives
The data collected on damage functions and cost functions provides 
the information needed to determine the most efficient policies and 
procedures for dealing with the adverse environmental effects of mining. 
Unfortunately, the procedures for comparing benefits and costs are 
not simple. A large literature has grown up around the subject, for 
many assumptions and qualifications are necessary. They cannot be dealt 
with here, but a simple case can be illustrated in Figure 2. The line 
sloping downward to the right indicates the marginal (additional) 
damages avoided throughout the economic system if wastes are held or 
treated to the indicated levels. The marginal costs of this procedure 
for all affected parties are represented by the other line. The opti­
mum solution for this case is represented by treatment or withholding 
of waste to the level indicated by "X". Note that some damages con­
tinue (those represented by the area CXD) but that the costs to society 
of reducing those damages (the area CXDB) would exeed the damages. 
However, the optimum level of control procedure has reduced damages 
by an amount represented by the area YOXC at a cost of AOXC.
Actual cases are of course far more complex. There are likely to 
be a variety of sources and kinds of waste and many alternatives for 
waste management, subsidence control, and the like, each of which has 
a different impact on the environment. Further, since the optimum 
level of abatement permits some residual damages, it is important to 
determine who is suffering from them. The optimum solution on effi­
ciency grounds might be politically unacceptable if most of the resi­
dual costs are imposed on an already disadvantaged group, or if it 
causes an increase in unemployment in a depressed area. 10/ Despite 
all of these complications there is every reason to think that optimum 
solutions can be developed for various waste management problems. Or, 
where non-economic issues are involved, the costs of suboptimum systems 
selected for social or political reasons can be measured. 1JJ
PUBLIC POLICY
We can bring these several threads together by suggesting some 
conclusions relevant to policy formulation for mined-land reclamation. 
The main point of the paper has been that benefit-cost methodology, 
while no panacea and despite numerous qualifications, offers the most 
useful approach to developing rational public methods for dealing with 
the several aspects of mined-land reclamation.
Consider first abandoned mining areas, which are somewhat easier 
to deal with than active mines because certain of the qualifications 
become irrelevant or even positive factors. For example, not only are 
aesthetic benefits obtained but employment opportunities are created. 
Nevertheless, given the large number of acres affected in many differ­
ent states, one has to ask where money should be spent, and he must 



































Figure 1.--Relationships between mine output and
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Units of waste withheld from discharge 
or treated (tons)
Figure 2.--An optimum level of waste management.
(After Kneese and Bower, op. cit.,
p. 82.)
93
ed area. Even casual benefit-cost analysis can suggest answers. To 
me it appears that the damages from past mining are so much greater, 
and the alternative uses to which mined land could be put so much more 
important, that the bulk of any funds should be spent in the urban 
and near-urban areas of the East. Part of this reclamation will 
simply be designed to eliminate continuing external costs ("basic re­
clamation"), but much will require the additional analysis necessary 
to justify more expensive special-purpose rehabilitation.
Regulation poses even more difficult problems. Any regulatory system 
must be able to deal with three questions. The first is whether the 
reservation of some tract for mining, which is commonly a single-purpose 
use of land, is justified under the particular circumstances at hand.
This requires a comparison of the net returns from various ways of 
using land, and consideration of such possibilities as sequential land 
use, hillside zoning, and scenic easements. Secondly, a regulatory law 
must consider what controls will be exercised during the mining process 
itself. The objective of the control scheme should be to force firms 
to take external effects into account. Ideally, the stringency of 
the control should depend upon expected external damages. (One possible 
technique involves "effluent charges" or taxes based on the quantity 
and quality of waste discharged. Their advantage lies in the fact 
that the charge can vary with, say, hydrology, so that it is more 
expensive to dispose of waste during low-water periods when pollution 
levels tend to rise. Effluent charges offer the additional advantage 
that they induce private research funds to be devoted to the more 
costly stages of the waste management program.) And, third, any 
regulatory scheme must consider the plans for closing of mines and 
quarries. This is a part of regulation because preplanning for the 
eventual use of the land is essential if total costs are to be minimized. 
There is no need to go back to the pre-mining conditions, but if the 
land is to be mined, it must be possible to return it to a condition 
that is both pleasing and productive.
Before closing I should admit that despite my emphasis up to now, 
we are not going to be able to wait for optimum solutions before act­
ing. There is a clear public demand for both the reduction of pollution 
from today's mines and the reclamation of areas scarred from past mining. 
It is not so clear what levels of environmental change are tolerable, 
but present levels are no longer acceptable.
This suggests two final points. First, we should not be afraid 
of formulating approximate or temporary solutions. What we should 
avoid are prescriptions that lock the environmental protection plan 
into some inefficient institutional or technologic path. Since re­
search almost invariably makes waste management less expensive than 
first estimated, public action should be flexible enough to permit 
private firms to adopt new solutions for environmental problems as 
these become available.
And, second, complete benefit-cost analysis is not likely to be
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achieved--or even be necessary--in all circumstances. It has to be ex­
pected that some data will be missing and some functions only poorly 
known. But neither of these difficulties obviates the need for making 
decisions in the present. And, hopefully, the partial analyses we can 
make will indicate just those areas in the physical and social sciences 
where further research and data collection could do most to improve our 
capability for making subsequent decisions.
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COMMENTS
QUESTION: Dr. Brooks, a lot of your discussion tended to be without 
specifics. This morning Mr. Cook mentioned figures something 
like $17.00 an acre spent on reclamtion in one place and I have seen 
figures, from Pennsylvania where over $2000 an acre was spent on reclam­
ation. In some places $50 an acre is a high price for the original 
land. Would you address yourself to this problem relative to your cost 
benefit analysis.
REPLY: In the first place I don't think that basic reclamation to 
eliminate many damages is going to cost $1500 to $2000 per acre.
In the mountains where you are trying to restore the surface or where 
you are trying to create some special feature I don't know what the 
figures would be. In the analysis I am going through which is for a 
general condition you shouldn't be spending that much if you can show 
that what you are getting out of it is simply not worth $2000 per acre. 
There will always be things that may not make sense because we say 
there are damages we can not measure. Asthetic effects are hard to 
determine and the people who are receiving these damages are either 
particularly deserving or have a particular problem. I think very 
largely this is going to be the rational in Appalachia. In Appalachia 
I have great difficulty finding tangible economical damages that I 
could point to as streams that are damaged that are very unproductive 
and fields that have been destroyed that are very unproductive. The 
people are not producing very much in the area and yet I feel a little 
uncomfortable going that way with their fear of strange ways. You can 
buy quite regularly Appalachian land for $50 an acre and the man you 
purchase from ends up with $3000 for his land, probably a very fair price. 
He may end up on the public welfare rolls some place elsewhere before he 
was a subsisting farmer in Appalachia. Perhaps you are transporting the 
basic problem from one place to another. Specifically it is that you 
shouldn't be spending $2000 if you can't show $2000 dollars worth of 
value. Also'this $2000 may be spent by the company and the return of 
this money show up somewhere else in the economy. That is perfectly 
legitimate from my point of view.
COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: I'd like to comment on that figure of $2000 
per acre that was mentioned in Pennsylvania. This is an area of a 
State Park and which the park people wanted the reclamation done in a 
particular manner for park purposes. This is not the cost of the 
reclamation of the strip-mined land in Pennsylvania's reclamation work.
We require the operator's to put up a bond of $500 per acre. There have 
been some areas where the strip mine operators have had to put up a 
larger bond than that in order to guarantee the restoration of the land 
to approximate original contour or terrace type contour, but I don't 
want to mislead anyone and have people think that it costs $2000 per 
acre to reclaim strip-mine land.
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COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: It seems to me that there is- one thing that 
should be considered with regard to the cost to the industry of modi­
fying mining methods. To prevent the creation of pollution disorders, 
which will last for some time, there is a lesser cost to the industry 
at the time that the work is done as opposed to the cost to the public 
of having to do it at some later time.
And a second thing I'd like to say with regard to that is that I 
think the value of the resource that's being extracted should be con­
sidered in terms of the cost that may be required to correct the prob­
lem that relates to it. In other words you may expect the total value 
of the coal that's extracted to maybe be $1000. This is just an 
arbitrary number, but it may cost the public $2000 if they have to re­
claim the land from which the mineral was extracted. And I'd like to 
ask a question of Dr. Brooks. If it is decided to go into projects 
relating to the reclamation of abandoned mine areas, do you have any 
comments on the most desirable way of financing this sort of thing, 
especially when it may be largely a regional problem?
Dr. Brooks: I agree with essentially everything you said. My own 
opinion is that we ought to divide this pretty clearly into two separate 
programs in terms of finances: reclamation of past areas and mining 
into, whenever you decide that point, the future. I think reclamation 
in the past areas should be a public financing responsibility for the 
practical reason that you can't find out who did the mining in a com­
munity. Also for the principle that it was the public that got the 
benefit of the cheap resources and now the public ought to pay the cost 
to get it back. It is a public decision now to go back and fix these 
areas up. For the future however what we're really saying is that we 
want the full cost of production - the full cost of production meaning 
both the production costs as they looked in the past and the environ­
mental impact to be treated as normal cost of production - so that as 
we go into the future these costs will be imposed upon the mining firm 
as part of the price of extracting the material. As a matter of fact,
I think the public would favor legislation to do this. I'd rather 
see environmental costs taken out of competition in the same way minimum 
wage laws took cutting wages out of the realm of competition back in the 
1930's. I think we ought to say that environmental work should be out 
of the realm of competition. No one should be able to undercut the 
price of coal or gravel or whatever you are producing because they're 
not observing their responsibilities for reclamation.
COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: I would like to make a comment. When you say 
that this takes reclamation out of the competition area, I think we can 
get back to the price of the product. If there's one place where we 
know that the mineral industry is weak, it's in what they get for the 
end product. Perhaps work in this area to adjust costs more realistically 
in the sale of this end product to the consumer is an area that needs 
some work done on it. We have to look at reclamation costs as a new 
dimension in mining and adjust the sale price of the product accordingly.
